Only in 2000 were the cuts halted. 6 Defence became a placeholder budget with just enough tiny increases here and there to prevent the collapse of major components of the forces. A small number of thirty-year-old tanks and fighter jets were upgraded while a larger number were parked for spare parts. The Paul Martin government was the first to promise major renewal projects to take effect in the end of the decade.
One of the first things the Stephen Harper government did was to up the 2005 Liberal promise of extra capital funding (above the base budget) from $13.6 billion to $17.6 billion. 7 In both the 2006 and 2007 budgets, defence spending received its biggest increase since Brian Mulroney's defence budget in 1984. 8 The operations and maintenance budget of the Canadian Forces is also under great stress. The base budget of $15 billion is stretched to the limit. Many agree that an emergency appropriation for operations of $1 billion is needed. 9 The Harper government acted immediately upon its promises of military equipment purchases. It began ordering strategic, tactical, and theatre airlift, trucks, modern artillery and even tanks. All of these have direct application to the Afghan theatre. Four C-17 Globemasters are now on order. Also, the aging and badly over-stretched C-130 Hercules were pushed far beyond the limit by operational needs in Afghanistan. Sixteen new Hercules planes have been ordered. A new fleet of medium-sized trucks is in the procurement stage. Six M-777 towed howitzers were bought for immediate deployment. Canada's lack of a large transport helicopter has made Canadian patrols and supply convoys vulnerable to insurgent attacks. Given the high demand for these helicopters, Canada may try to acquire about 16 Chinook helicopters directly from the US Army. 10 When the aging Leopard Tanks proved of great use both in terms of intimidating Taliban fighters and providing direct fire support during operation Medusa, the government decided to lease 20 modern 2A6M Leopards from the Germans ready for the summer 2007. Soon after, it announced the purchase of 100 used Leopard 2 tanks from the Dutch for $650 million.
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Most of these purchases were badly needed given the rust out of Canadian Forces equipment. But it was operational needs in Kandahar that propelled them forward. Because the military needs this equipment today to save lives, the government resorted to off-theshelf buying, bypassing the lengthy competitive bid process. This situation is a clear catch-22 as buying without competitive bidding may in fact drive up the long-term cost. The Harper government was criticized for this by Sheila Fraser, the Auditor General, in her March 2007 report. 12 Between 2006 and 2009, nearly the entire combat strength of Canadian Forces is dedicated to the Afghan mission as one of Canada's three battle groups will be in the South, one will just have returned, and one will be preparing to go. Recruitment targets for regular forces were exceeded in 2006-2007 with 6,426 new sign ups.
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Given that Canadian Forces are stretched to the limit, that training resources are scarce, and that equipment is wearing out, a break or temporary slow down in Canadian operations in 2009 may be wise. At the same time, the Canadian military from the top ranks to the privates are fully committed to see this struggle to the end.
Afghanistan and the Rapprochement in Canadian-American Relations
The human security initiatives developed by Lloyd Axworthy gradually set Canada on a collision course with American foreign policy even though Prime Minister Jean Chrétien got on well with President Bill Clinton.
14 It is not that the Clinton government opposed the ideals of human security. But Axworthy coached a coalition of states that refused to consider any compromises. As a result, American vested military interests combined with overwhelming opposition in the US Senate pushed Clinton out of the human security agenda.
The US goodwill evaporated in 2001. The senior advisers in the George W. Bush administration were critical of the diplomatic gap that had emerged between Canada's international political agenda and that of the United States. They were also outspoken about Canada's 'free-rider' status in terms of North American defence spending. Canadian overtures in 2003 for a complementary role in military operations conducted by the European Union looked to Washington as undermining NATO.
The Bush-Chrétien relationship kept deteriorating on both foreign and domestic policy. Chrétien's public and clumsy opposition to Bush's policy on Iraq, plummeted the relationship to an icy low. Ottawa declined American invitations to join (cost-free) in continental missile defence even though potential North Korean and Iranian missiles would fly over Canadian aerospace. The American invitation to redesign the 1958 North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) from an integrated tactical warning and attack assessment into a larger bi-national command was turned down by Canada in early 2002.
Canada faced a border blockage on September 12 as a result of new US security policies on the long mutual border. Given the fact that Canadian imports and exports with the United States in 2005 amounted to 52% of Canadian GDP, any delay at the border threatened Canadian prosperity. Even though the two governments soon signed a 'Smart Border Plan,' security regulations are continuing to slow down trade. The cost to industry of waiting and processing at the border is now estimated at nearly 3% of total trade volume. 15 Stephen Harper made it a priority to change the political relationship. He used a new Canadian commitment in Afghanistan and re-investment in Canadian defence as the way to build respect and political capital in Washington. Though Harper's unambiguous assistance in the war on terror, his renewal of Canadian Forces, and the quick resolution of the lumber dispute, registered in Washington as a new beginning in bilateral cooperation. 17 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted in September 2006 that Canada's efforts in the South of Afghanistan were "critical" in the war against terror."
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Afghanistan and the Political Debate in Canada
Opinion polls show that while Canadians feel proud about their soldiers' valour, there remains a lot of trepidation whether the Taliban and the drug lords can be defeated.
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Canadian public support for the war effort has hovered between 47% and 57% in 2006. 20 The split in the public makes the issue fertile ground for partisan politics.
Tapping into perennial Anti-Americanism in Canada, the New Democratic Party under Jack Layton has depicted Canada's role as pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for the Americans, despite the fact that some 20,000 American soldiers are doing so themselves. Layton has called for Canada to pull all its 2500 troops out of all combat and peace enforcement operations.
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French Quebecers are traditionally more reluctant than English Canadians about military deployments. 22 Even a large element within the Liberal Party is mobilizing public opinion against Canada's role in Afghanistan for the purpose preventing the Conservatives from becoming the alternative to the separatists in the next election. With only 124 seats in the 308 member House of Commons, Harper remains vulnerable to several combinations of opposition to his Afghanistan policy.
Harper's first trip abroad was a visit to the troops in Afghanistan. In so doing, he underscored the national profile of the mission and his personal commitment to its success. Harper invoked Canada's "warrior heritage," and argued that it was in Canada's national interest to win in the war on terror. 23 While the interim Liberal leader Bill Graham was supportive of Harper's moves to increase the defence budget and further expand Canada's military role in southern Afghanistan, the approach toward Afghanistan in the Liberal caucus began to fracture under its newly elected leader Stephane Dion. The Harper government was accused of doing too much fighting and not enough reconstruction. It was also criticized for not dealing with the growing production of poppy used for heroin which constitutes the bulk of Afghanistan's GDP. 24 The Harper government defended its policy by arguing that there was no disagreement on the need for reconstruction and that long-term security could not be obtained without it. However, it added, that reconstruction could not take hold until secure conditions were established and that Canada would not shrink away from that task. Just to be on the safe side politically, Harper announced in early 2007 that he would add another $100 million for reconstruction and development projects for both 2007 and 2008 on top of the existing $100 million annual aid to Afghanistan that includes funds for police training, de-mining, road construction and counter-narcotics. 25 In April 2007, the Liberal Party introduced a motion to make 2009 a binding exit for Canadian troops. Given Dion's unpopularity, he made sure not to designate the motion as a vote of confidence. Supported by the Bloc Quebecois (50 seats), the Liberals could have easily won the motion if the anti-war NDP did not have its own worries about triggering an election (the rising Green Party). Thus, the NDP voted with the Conservatives on the interesting principle that being against the mission, it could not support a vote that would not close it down until 2009.
The opposition parties have grasped the opportunity to harass the government on its Afghan policy over allegations that Taliban prisoners taken by Canadian troops and handed over to Afghan authorities were mistreated or tortured. Even though Canadian troops are not accused of any wrongdoing and are obliged to hand prisoners over to the Afghan government, incomplete reporting by the Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor and accusations of blacked-out reports on the part of the Department of Foreign Affairs of these prisoners have allowed the opposition to doubt the moral high ground of the government.
Appeals to international morality and law do have sway with Canadian opinion makers, but even here the opposition has not gained much electoral ground. 26 Canada is clearly pushing the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission for ways to monitor the condition of prisoners. Perhaps, some opposition politicians are trying to invoke the ghost of Abu Ghraib.
Still, Canadian public opinion remains jittery about Afghanistan. They worry whether NATO and the West can prevail. There clearly is some blowback from Iraq in the Canadian psyche. The opposition attempt to picture Afghanistan as Harper's Iraq does sting. By May 2007, more people began to look for a so-called exit strategy.
Afghanistan and the Future of Canada's Commitment
Most analyst agree that in 2003 the United States switched too much of its military attention to Iraq and subsequently allowed the security conditions to deteriorate in Afghanistan. At the same time, many nations pledged funds and troops but did not follow through. It was a case of "security with a light footprint." 27 By 2006, it was clear that Kandahar and its environs could be lost again to the Taliban. It is at this crucial strategic point that the Harper government stepped up to the plate. In Operation Medusa, Canada took a lead role alongside British and US forces, and later supported by Dutch troops, to drive back a Taliban offensive. If NATO's operations indeed reached a "tipping point," as British General David Richards put it in October of 2006, it seems the Alliance was able to tilt the balance back in its favour, and Canada was part of that hard tilt. Though NATO provides much needed security, it is only one of the ingredients needed for ultimate success. The other elements are development assistance and reconstruction, military and policy efforts to translate security into stability, and more governance capacity on the part of Afghan government. On all three scores, the mission is still in its early stages.
It is estimated that in 2006, Afghanistan only received $1.5 billion in development aid. 34 Compared to international efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo, aid per capita to Afghans has been low; $50 in 2006. Aid per capita in the other two war-ravaged countries was $800 and $400 respectively. 35 Some studies suggest that aid per capita should at least double to $100 for stability operations to even gain a foothold.
36 Some 1000 schools, clinics and government buildings have been built in the last five years. 37 At the same time, Taliban and insurgents often attack these to undo the achievements.
In terms of troops on the ground-which is believed to be a major deterrent to insurgent attacks-ISAF has only has 6 soldiers for every 100 square kilometres. In Bosnia, NATO deployed about 117 soldiers for the same area right after the hostilities and even today there are more soldiers per 1000 population in Bosnia than in Afghanistan.
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Many Afghans react negatively to foreigners. Still, it is wrong to conclude that the Taliban has the support of the local population. Polls done in the last two years show that upwards from 90% of the respondents do not want a return of Taliban rule. While confidence in the Hamid Karzai government and NATO was slipping in 2005 and 2006, this does not translate into more support for the Taliban. Rather, widespread corruption and the lack of speedy reconstruction explain the rise in popular critique of the Karzai government. Foreign troops (both US and NATO) are supported by more than 70% of the population. 39 Many tribal and village leaders work with the PRT's and the latter's success depends on the endorsement they receive from local authorities.
Though Taliban fighters are usually soundly defeated in any conventional battle, they have a "seemingly inexhaustible supply of recruits, enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan, and almost certainly have greater staying power than the foreign troops." 40 The targets in the Afghanistan Compact agreed between the Karzai government and international participants in London in 2006 included an Afghan stability capability of 70,000 for the army and some 60,000 for the Police forces. Especially the latter task is still in its early stage. This year, the American government promised $1 billion to train and finance this fledgling police force.
The supply of insurgent fighters is greatly complicated by the fact that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is porous, that Pakistan's president Pervez Musharraf does not command control over large areas of Northwest Pakistan, and that a large amount of the insurgency is financed by the international poppy trade.
Pakistan considers Afghanistan part of its strategic space in its tense relationship with India. Given that both the tribal and regional strategic dynamics link the two states, the future stability of any central government in Afghanistan depends as much on Pakistani cooperation as on stabilizing conditions on the ground in Afghanistan. NATO should try to be the bridge to help both governments cooperate on stability operations. Boosting economic ties with Pakistan must also form part of a Western strategy to create incentives for regional cooperation.
Afghanistan is the source of nine-tenths of the world's heroin. Poppy is estimated to be nine times more lucrative for the grower than wheat and is estimated at 40% of Afghanistan's GDP. 41 The poppy economy is the biggest temptation for corruption inside the Karzai government and, ironically, is the largest source of Taliban income. A crop eradication program may drive farmers into the arms of the insurgency. A crop substitution plan is urgently needed. Pakistan is currently blocking Afghanistan's traditional trading relation with India.
Any fair-minded comparative perspective on the situation in Afghanistan would suggest that reaching the objectives of stability, governance and reconstruction will take upwards from 10 years. For NATO nations, including Canada, this objective specifically means providing enough military strength on the ground until insurgents and ethnic factions realize that the movement towards a stable central government in Kabul is irreversible. Ultimately, this 'end state' precludes the return of Taliban rule, but it does not preclude negotiations with moderate Taliban factions-if such emerge-for the purpose of their integration into Afghanistan's new government. 42 The daunting challenge of subsuming the political culture of warlords and tribal leaders into democratic institutions, including police and army may require this step. 43 Canadian opposition parties' clamour for the return to light peacekeeping and mostly humanitarian assistance as the centre piece of Canadian foreign policy is unrealistic and unhelpful for the long-term future of Afghanistan. With this constant political pressure on his back, Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor indicated in early April 2007 that when some of the targets of security, governance and reconstruction are reached, NATO and Canadian troop commitments could be scaled down and even withdrawn by 2010. 44 This target date is too optimistic. With the right burden-sharing inside NATO in which other NATO members such as Germany, France, Italy and Spain also take turns in the challenging theatre in the South of Afghanistan, Canada should take some time to replenish and then return to the effort.
The revolution in Canadian foreign policy means that the country no longer speaks loudly while carrying a small stick. Instead, Canadian hard security efforts in the south of Afghanistan are laying the groundwork for long-term success in securing peace and nation building. The revolution in Canadian foreign policy is finally re-investing in one of the finest militaries in the world and is creating a much stronger context for Canadian-American relations. It will ultimately lead to greater respect for Canadian interests and values in the international community. 
Notes
